

# **PALESTINIAN DEVELOPMENT: KNOWLEDGE AND PROGRESS**

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**Table of Contents:**

**Development Visions**

**Palestinian Development**

**Structuralism and Palestinian Development**

**An Educational Cultural of Understand Palestinian Development**

**Experience and Reality**

**An Educational Culture for Development Studies**

**Vision, Perspective, Strategy, Theory, and Policy**

**Appendix**

***“The absence of a PNA [Palestinian National Authority] unified and empowering development vision leads to confusion and conflict within its institutions and presents it with challenges that need to be dealt with.”***

***(DSP 1999:14, emphasis added)***

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## DEVELOPMENT VISIONS

### **Understanding human motivation**

Everybody believes in “development”: but while academics, community organizers, government planners, social activists, etc... are all apparently concerned with people fulfilling their potentials - “progress” – there is no universal agreement as to what progressive change *is*, nor agreement as to the appropriate development strategy.

For instance, the following quote highlights the significance of individual enterprise in effecting progress:

“General backwardness, economic unresponsiveness, and lack of enterprise are well-nigh universal in the less developed world ...

Economic development require *modernization of the mind*. It requires

revision of the attitudes, modes of conduct and institutions adverse to material progress.”

(Bauer 1991:187 and 1976:84, emphasis added)

Though for Frances Stewart the emphasis is upon a “just” social structure:

“Development involves *structural transformation* of the economy and society ... During this process ... special efforts are needed to ensure that social justice occurs...”

(Stewart 1994:98, emphasis added)

But Ben Wisner argues that the “special efforts” to achieve social justice cannot be conceived in terms of “structural transformation”. Poverty is a reflection of people’s powerlessness; the powerful have to be politically challenged if social change is to relieve disadvantage. Democracy and empowerment is the precursor of progress:

“The poor learn from ... conflicts [with vested interests] ... and its members ... *grow in consciousness and political power.*”

(Wisner 1988:15, emphasis added)

“Progress” in people’s lives can only be achieved if individuals are better able to fulfil their potentials. Progressive social change and development can only be effected if individuals’ behaviour alters; people adapt their ambitions and expectations towards goals that advance individual *and* social life styles. But what these goals should be is not obvious.

### **Development “visions” and development “strategies”**

People are social beings, and *all* activity in one form or another is social activity. Individual experience *always* takes place in, and is defined by, a wider context of social relations, relations which qualitatively evolve within the development process. While people are aware of their own experience, *their* reality, individuals can never be fully conscious of the web of social relations which is the context of their activity, *social* reality. The complexities of social life have to be conceptualized. The relationships which are the context of individuals’ experience, the transformation of which defines progress and development, while intuitively appreciated, have to be *theorized* to be understood: social reality is a *theoretical* reality.

As will be argued below, a theoretical understanding of social life defines development strategies, understandings which reflect deeper, more fundamental intuitions about human motives and individuals’ interests.

Humans, uniquely, *know* the past, and *anticipate* the future. And to purposefully fulfil people’s creative potentials, the social context of individual experience has to be understood, highlighting future potentials and possible action for their realization. *Tomorrow* was born *yesterday*. But the social context of individual experience is far too complex to be fully appreciated. Inevitably an understanding of the social parameters to individual activity is predicated on a set of *beliefs* about human nature and human motivation and

behaviour. These beliefs, or assumptions, set the intellectual parameters for the rationalization of behaviour and the theorization of progress.

“Scientists, like other intellectuals, come to their work with a world view, a set of preconceptions that provides the framework for their analyses of the world. These conceptions enter at both an explicit and an implicit level, but even when invoked explicitly, *unexamined and unexpressed assumptions* underlie them.”

(Levins & Lewontin 1985:267, emphasis added)

There is not space here to consider further “the unexamined and unexpressed” assumptions that are the framework of scientific analyses of the world (for a detailed discussion see, Cole 1999:Part 4), but such assumptions reflect the beliefs which understand the social context of individuals’ experience, and structure interpretations of social reality, defining the possibility of meaningful change and progress. It is these beliefs which define the *development vision*.

Beliefs in human potentials, understandings of human nature, imply a *vision*, a “world view”, that defines progress. This vision conceptualizes the *dynamic* of development. And the development dynamic explains how people might better fulfil their potentials, and *why* societies change, suggesting a development *strategy* and development policy.

Theorizations of development policy, *schools* of development thought, are many and varied: but there are essentially only three development *strategies* for conceptualizing progress, and in terms of which theoretical analyses and development policies are framed.

Development strategies reflect “visions” of human motivation and human nature, visions which socially contextualize behaviour to allow a theoretical understanding of individuals’ experience and define development policy.

‘...it is impossible to simply stare at the world as it immediately presents itself to our eyes and hope to understand it. To make sense of the world we must bring to it a framework composed of elements of our past experience; what we have learned from others’ experience, both in the present and in the past; and of our later reflections on and theories about this experience.’

(Rees 1998:63)

Different development visions conceptualize human behaviour differently, and yet address the *same* experience of change, and hence produce distinct understandings from the *same* empirical data.

*All* human experience is social experience: at the *same* time that experience can be interpreted within distinct development strategies, as: in a trivial sense, simply a consequence of individuals’ choices (c.f. the Bauer quote, above); a question of the appropriate “just” social structure to allow choice (c.f. the Stewart quote); or a consequence of the power and the social opportunity to be able to choose (c.f. the Wisner quote). These are the *visions*, which define the *strategies*, which allows the experience of social change to be conceptualized and *theorized* , in terms of which development policy and action is specified (see, Cole 1999: Chapters 1 and 14 to 18).

In addressing individuals’ social experience either we focus on: the “individual” (who chooses), “society” (the context of how people choose), or the “social individual” (the power to be able to choose).

Below we will address how these strategic visions specifically define development policy in the case of Palestine. However, this analysis must be prefaced by a consideration of the implications and significance of alternative perspectives on progress: in particular noting the ideological bias of development theories, and the interests served by the various intellectual analyses of social change.

## **Reality, intellectual visions, and progress**

The “real world” beyond individual experience, the world of *social relations*, is a theoretical reality, an understanding of which is based on *interpretations* of individuals’ experiences.

Social reality cannot be observed, but is discovered *through* observation.

Theoretical constructions of social reality are conducted *within* the intellectual parameters of beliefs on human nature: *visions* of development

“...the *conceiving mind* is the real human being and ... the *conceived world* the only reality...”

(Marx 1976:32, emphasis added)

Development strategy, in terms of which social change is theorized and development policies specified, reflects a more or less partial vision of social life: a vision which rationalizes experience. And the narrower the range of human experience theoretically appropriated, the less encompassing will be the theorization of social activity: the more partial and biased will be the conception of progress.

Because a development vision and the resultant strategy, defines “progress”, “justice”, “the good society”, etc., necessarily a strategy for social organization is implied. A particular conception of society is justified; an image of social life which invariably prejudices and advantages certain people and certain social interests.

Inevitably a political interest is defined.

## **Development visions: economic development, human development, or political development**

Is development the opportunity for individuals to exploit their unique talents and choose to enjoy the consumption of those commodities most suited to



their individual tastes: what economists call “maximizing utility” (see Cole 1995: Chapter 3, Cole 1998:Chapters 4, 5, and Cole 1999:Chapter 11). Development is then *economic* development, as markets expand to allow greater consumer choice, and the opportunity, within the context of competitive markets, for more individuals to exploit their unique talents in production.

Alternatively it can be argued that individuals are fundamentally social, the basis of social life being co-operation within a “technical division of labour”; production rather than consumption is emphasized. In this scenario development policy addresses the institutional parameters of technical co-operation within society, allowing the technical exigencies of extant and emerging technologies to be socially exploited. Markets are managed in the social interest – *human development*, see, Cole 1995:Chapter 4, Cole 1998:Chapters 4, 6, and Cole 1999:Chapter 12).

But it can also be coherently argued that although individuals seek to maximize utility as consumers, through competitive exchange, economic growth can only be achieved within a technical division of labour based upon co-operation within production. Progress, the fulfilment of people’s potentials, is a consequence of *both* individual consumer choice *and* the technical management of social existence. And individual choice takes place within social parameters, at the same time *changing* those parameters. The process of development is a *dialectic* between the individual *and* society.

Individuals’ potentials are *social* potentials, which change with experience as people are able to achieve far more acting in concert with other people than they can by themselves; progress is consequent upon people’s abilities and opportunities evolving with social opportunity. And since individuals’ potentials are unique, progress can only be achieved if people are able to participate in the organization of social existence. At times, as people change, they will be frustrated from fulfilling their emergent potentials by extant social forces outside their control, they will be disadvantaged – e.g. becoming unemployed,

or not having the opportunity to access educational resources, or even starving to death, etc...

And if people understand the social context of their experience and are aware of the constraints leading to disadvantage; and also if they are conscious of others that share these frustrations and with whom they have a common interest, then, with social mobilization and political organization, pressure can be brought to bear on the political and economic social status quo, and change, development, might be effected.

In as far as people are able to more effectively participate in the control of their social experience and expand their potentials, there is “progress”.

### **The visions of development**

Referring back to the opening quotes from Peter Bauer, Frances Stewart and Ben Wisner; these encapsulate distinct visions of progress and development strategy. Is progress to be conceived in terms of individuals’ choices, with development strategy emphasizing the “modernization of the mind” – *modernization theory* – the “right” to individual choice?

Or is progress the efficient institutional management of extant and emerging technologies of production, with society being “structurally transformed” to create an environment of “social justice”?

Or perhaps, development is a question of “political power”, the right to choose as consumers, *and* participate in the social regulation of production, and the “poor learn from conflicts” – *power and democracy?*

For an example of the *same* development experience being coherently analysed within the intellectual parameters of competing development strategies, see Cole 1998.

We will now consider these visions on humanity and related development strategies, in the theoretical analysis of the experience of the Palestinian development process.

## **Palestinian Development**

As argued above, reality beyond individuals' experience can *only* be appreciated theoretically. *All* "objective" phenomena are "subjectively" perceived. What the (social) world *is* can only be discovered by comparing and contrasting perceptions of social existence. The question has to be asked: "What must the real world (of social relations) be, for there to be different, coherent, interpretations of human experience?"

Hence, in what follows, I extensively quote from different analyses of Palestinian development within contrasting development visions. A range of theoretical interpretations of the same experience, within competing development strategies are contrasted.

Visions of development defining the "good society", reflect distinct social and economic interests. What is judged to be the "best" or "correct" development strategy can never be "unbiased" or "absolute". The chimera of neutrality is replaced by an understanding of intellectual bias.

### **Modernization Theory and Palestinian Development**

"Modernization theory emphasises approaches towards Western, capitalist 'modernity'."

(Harrison 1988:193)

Progress is understood to be a consequence of independent individuals being *free* to choose, and act in their own interests. The word "free" is emphasised, as it is assumed (believed) that as long as competitive markets obtain, the ideal being a regime of "perfect competition" (see, Cole 1995:Chapter 3), *and* there is free choice, individuals' well being will reflect their unique talents. The rich deserve their advantage and the poor have only themselves to blame. And clearly, in a market society, the richer you are the "freer" you are to choose.

The appropriate development strategy, then, is one of modernizing society so that market processes are the dynamic of social change; and wealth “trickles” down from the enterprising and industrious rich to the entrepreneurially “challenged” poor (see, Cole 1999:Chapter 11). In this context for much of the 1990s the development strategy of the World Bank, believing that free markets were the solution to increasing world poverty, was “good governance”. And good governance was defined as: “...the rules that make markets work efficiently...” (World Bank 1992:1).

In a recent study of Palestinian development, jointly produced by the Palestine Economic Policy Research Institute (MAS) and the World Bank (WB) (Diwan & Shaban 1999), while acknowledging the constraint of Israeli occupation, the large refugee population, apart from one road bridge into Jordan and one into Egypt the dependence on Israel for access to the outside world, the separation of the West Bank from the Gaza strip, the on-going process of institution building since the 1993 Declaration of Principles on Interim Self-Government Arrangements signed in Oslo, the deficient transport, electricity, telecommunications, water, sanitation, infrastructure, etc... *all* of these constraints are considered in terms of the effect on inhibiting free market exchange, and thereby limiting individual freedom, and progress and development.

An effective development strategy is considered to be one which takes advantage of...

“...a dynamic private sector... The removal of regulatory constraints, the establishing of supporting institutions and infrastructure, and reduced political uncertainty *should* ... allow the economy to grow. Once free of the legacy of high debts, inefficient public enterprise, and a revenue base too small to meet needed public expenditures, public policy can focus on creating a framework conducive for development. Direct foreign investment is likely to follow once *profitable opportunities* and a stable environment are established.”

(Diwan & Shaban 1999:1 and 12, emphasis added)

The conclusion is market led development.

“It is often tempting to compare the WBGS [West Bank/Gaza Strip] with Singapore and Hong Kong, as model small economies, based on international trade and investment...”

(Mody 1999:189)

Just as economic “orthodoxy” (where individual consumers, choosing to maximise utility, are seen as the economic dynamic, the subjective preference theory of value – see Cole 1995:Chapter 3, the economic perspective that underlies modernization theory) assumes an ideal future, “perfect competition”, as the standard against which *progress* is measured, so the belief that underlies the MAS/WB study of Palestine is that once the economy is free from the legacy of “high debts, inefficient public enterprise and a revenue base too small for needed public expenditures”, then, progress *should be* effected. This belief assumes away the “theory of the second best” and the “capital controversy”, both of which are economic arguments which highlight the logical contradictions inherent in conceptions of progress based on “market equilibrium” – contradictions which can only be overcome (or ignored) by the assumption that individuals are independent, utility maximisers, and not by a logical analysis (see, Cole 1999:39-43, 53-58). It is an axiomatic belief beyond empirical verification.

The methodological principles that underlie orthodox economic analyses of market exchange, analyses which are the basis of neo-liberal development strategies, are the scientific principles of “positivism” (see, Cole 1999:Chapter 15). This ideology of science confers legitimacy on analyses, where economic “events” in social life (a consequence of individuals’ subjective preferences and choices) are statistically correlated, establishing “degrees of confidence” that there is a “relationship” (not causation) between economic phenomena. From these relationships hypotheses are derived predicting the course of future events: the past is extrapolated into the future. And if these

predictions are realized, then the theory is legitimated as “science”. Inevitably, policies within this economic (and associated development) strategy emphasize individuals’ “freedom to choose”, and development policies are oriented to the modernization of society to regulate individuals’ behaviour within the parameters of a competitive, market economy.

Given that it is incumbent on the analyst, working within positivist intellectual parameters, to establish a “relationship” between variables before hypothesizing future development trends, the MAS/WB economists should know better than to assert a completely unjustified comparison between Palestine, and “the model small economies” of Hong Kong and Singapore. What about other small states such as, Samoa, Anguilla, St Helina, the Cook Islands, Dominica, Grenada, Kiribati, Mayotte, St Kitts/Nevis and the other Caribbean islands, Seychelles, Tonga, Latvia, the Balkan states, etc...: why aren’t these economic “models” a relevant comparison to Palestine?

Clearly the intention was to suggest a quite unwarranted relation between financial capital, market competition, development and small geographical size: a relationship which conveniently disregards the extensive economic intervention and political repression that have characterized the “development” of Hong Kong and Singapore.

There is no excuse for the proffering of such nonsense by the MAS/WB theorists under the guise of a serious analysis, particularly as such assertions are outside the intellectual parameters of the approach to knowledge and science implied by a modernization strategy for development (see the section Understanding Development, below).

Individual choice is believed to be the development dynamic, and development strategy is based on a vision of utopia: the apogee of “development”, the vision of a “perfectly competitive” world. “Progress” is defined as the trend towards individual freedom and market competition: what economists call a *Pareto Improvement*.

'The Utopian theoretical construct of perfect competition ... becomes relevant as a reference point by which to judge the health of an economy, as well as the remedies suggested for its amelioration.'

(Lal 1983:15)

Market forces are believed to be the harbinger of progress. Through Adam Smith's "invisible hand" economic welfare is bestowed on particularly talented, enterprising individuals, wealth which "trickles down" through competitive markets to the less talented; and there is progress!

Competitive markets, through which independent individuals choose, are assumed to be the determinant variable in achieving progress: markets are *fetishized*.

"Fetish ... an inanimate object worshipped by primitive peoples for its supposed inherent magical powers..."

(A Concise Oxford Dictionary, Ninth Edition)

Of course, markets by themselves can do or achieve nothing: *people* have to *choose*. And what we believe people to be inescapably defines progress. The belief that individuals are endowed with a set of tastes and talents which define their subjective preferences for the maximisation of "utility", evangelically trumpeted by orthodox economists, has become the Holy Grail of neo-liberal, modernization, development theorists.

Apart from the logical contradictions in the theory of perfect competition noted above, Edward Said correctly points out (Said 2000:Chapter 5), that deregulation of economic activity in the name of individual liberty, to establish economic "equilibrium", presupposes an environment of laws and regulations which guarantee contracts: commissions to oversee stockmarkets, legal provision for private sector investment, a vigorous civil society promoting competition, and independent judiciary, a free press, etc... - none of which



obtain in Palestine. Still, for modernization theorists, the process by which such a culture emerges, the “modernization” of society, *is* development. And the injustices and exploitation, and suffering and disadvantage which arise from “market imperfections” are incidental to the march of “everyman” from tradition to modernity.

Modernization theory has been the dominant development ideology for much of the past 20/25 years, and has been the basis of the neo-liberal strategy of free-markets, as effected through the International Monetary Fund/World Bank “structural adjustment” programmes for indebted countries. But this strategy has not produced anything that might be unambiguously called “development”. Absolute poverty has increased (see, World Bank 2000:14/5), and market reforms (structural adjustment programmes), rather than generating growth and employment as enterprising individuals respond to market incentives, have apparently led to increased unemployment. The United Nations Development Programme estimates that ‘...at least 150 million of the world’s workers were unemployed at the end of 1998, and as many as 900 million were underemployed. About 35 million people were unemployed in the OECD countries alone.’ (UNDP 2000:40). Globalized markets have not brought global prosperity.

However, still the proponents of market solutions see a potential for development, if only individuals’ behaviour could be controlled to not prejudice other individuals’ rights to be enterprising and to competitively exchange: perfect markets.

‘...[capitalism] is far from perfect ... [but at least] ... [t]he market’s advantage is that it allows things to evolve in a *very human way*, through the *free choice* of millions of people.”

(*Economist*, 11<sup>th</sup> September 1999, emphasis added)

The “New Institutional Economists” (NIE), while still believing individuals to be independent, “naturally” choosing (in a very human way) so as to maximise utility, have offered an explanation as to why market strategies have

increased poverty. Attempts by independent individuals to give themselves some security in a world where “perfect information” does not obtain, an uncertain world where people’s livelihoods reflect the ebb and flow of market forces, have led to social behaviour being institutionalized (rather than being competitive). This has frustrated enterprising individuals from fulfilling their potentials, and wealth “trickling down” to the poor; hence as the *Economist* puts it ‘...capitalism is far from perfect...’: the problem is not “capitalism” but “people”! (see Cole 1999:13, 175, and Harriss, Hunter & Lewin 1995).

And while the World Bank’s 1999/2000 World Development Report (World Bank 2000), is still in favour of competitive free trade as an ideal – allowing “...things to evolve in a very human way...” - calling for ‘...broader trade liberalization...’ (World Bank 2000:5) working towards the ideal of “perfect” markets, the Report, following the emphasis of NIE theorists, acknowledges that “localization”, and the institutionalization of behaviour is the janus face of “globalization”, reflecting a...

*“...desire of people for a greater say in their government, [which] manifests itself in the assertion of regional identities. It pushes national governments to reach down to regions and cities as the best way to manage changes affecting domestic politics and patterns of growth.”*

(World Bank 2000:3, emphasis added)

“Localization”, the desire by people for security and to have a greater say in their governance, is a reaction against the uncertainty of markets – precisely the logic of the New Institutional Economists - which negates the benefits of liberalized markets and “globalization”...

*‘...the progressive integration of the world’s economies, [which] require national governments to reach out to international partners as the best way to manage changes affecting trade, financial flows and the global environment.’*

(World Bank 2000:2, emphasis added)

So, the *apparent* change of emphasis in recent times of the World Bank, to what has been called “Social Development” or “Human Development” (a concern with “poverty” rather than “economic growth”) *does not* reflect a changed development *strategy*. The “vision” of independent, utility maximizing individuals, exchanging in competitive markets, on which the theoretical analysis of progress is based, remains unchanged: entrepreneurs are still thought to be the harbinger of progress.

## Structuralism and Palestinian development

“Development must ... be conceived of as a multi-dimensional process involving major changes in social structures.”

(Todaro 1981:70)

People depend on each other within a technical division of labour for existence, and progress is a consequence of the efficient management of society to encourage *co-operation* within technically defined parameters; not market *competition*.

Development is essentially a “technical” process to be socially managed by trained “experts” (not expedited by individually talented entrepreneurs); and within a technically rational programme of structural change, development problems are essentially questions of the “sharing out” of the fruits of co-operation, issues of *distribution* of the technical product. And towards the end of the 20<sup>th</sup> century the world was “...increasingly divided between those who enjoy opulent affluence and those who live in dehumanizing poverty, servitude and economic insecurity.’ (Korten 1995:20). The issue is not one of the advantages of globalized competition, but the inadequate and incompetent institutional management of technical change: there has not been a just and fair distribution of the technical benefits of international economies of scale.

For instance, in 1992 the United Nations Development Programme, an international development institution which has adopted such a development strategy, distinct to that of the World Bank, reported that the richest fifth of the world received 82.7% of total world income, the poorest 20% receiving just 1.4% (UNDP 1992). In 1998 the World Trade Organization (WTO 1998) estimated that the richest 20% received over 86% of world income, and between 1960 and 1997 the income gap between the richest 20% and the poorest 20% had deteriorated from 30:1 to 74:1.

Within the structuralist development strategy, development is *not* a necessary consequence of economic growth; progress is not the result of extraordinarily talented entrepreneurs competing to maximise individual utility in a free market environment. Development is more than free enterprise and the modernization of society. Now, markets are *only* conceived of as a mechanism for systematically co-ordinating disparate individuals within a technical division of labour: a mechanism that is increasingly anachronistic as technologies become ever more sophisticated requiring planning, and become ever less susceptible to regulation by market forces - *particularly* in a globalized economy (see, Ormerod 1998, Soros 1998).

Markets have to be systematically *managed* in the general interest. Economic exchange is only *one* aspect in social existence; an existence in which people's activity is co-ordinated through *social institutions*, rather than individually *controlled* by laws on individual exchange. 'The one clear conclusion is that there is no single cause of poverty...' (Gillis, et al, 1983). The approach is *multi-disciplinary* and *problem-solving*: distinct disciplines - sociology, economics, political science, psychology, etc.. - bring expert knowledge to the various dimensions of social existence, and are combined, like so many pieces in a jigsaw puzzle, to address particular problems – disability, education, gender, employment, etc.. – concluding in policy strategies for the better institutional management of social existence to resolve the disadvantage of groups of people.

*Particular* experiences of disadvantage are addressed *holistically*. Individuals are considered in the context of society, which is *more than* its individual citizens – there is a social structure to which people have to adapt; a theoretical approach contrary to the *reductionism* of modernization theorists, where society is no more than the individuals that compose it and a concern with personal choice is the appropriate analytical methodology. Structuralist development policies however emphasize the need for institutional reform for progressive change: for example, in the Palestinian context, gender and inequality (see, WSC 1999).

‘As Palestinian society enters a new phase and attempts to set a course for *human* development ... [t]he potentials for social and economic development will be stunted if women are marginalized from the development process.’

(WSC 1999:5, emphasis added)

The emphasis is upon *human* development through structural change, rather than *economic* development through liberalized markets. The Women’s Study Centre analysis examines, in a multi-disciplinary holistic framework, key aspects of women’s social experience in Palestine - legal and human rights, political participation, employment, health, education – identifying systematic, structural obstacles to women’s inclusion in the social construction of progress.

Women’s legal status is pivotal; legal reform, and the definition and observance of human rights *should* reflect ‘...the needs and interests of women in various social and economic settings...’ (WSC 1999:5). And initiatives for ‘...gender equality in the law cannot be successful without strengthening the Palestinian legal system.’ (WSC 1999:5): development through institutional reform.

Palestinian civil society is in transition, evolving ‘...in a pluralistic and progressive direction...’, and to this end the women’s movement has ‘...devoted a great deal of effort and attention to an empowerment agenda for women ... [though] problems of centralism and nepotism ... [have] hindered a new form of participation and women’s leadership.’ (WSC 1999:6).

The lack of a “gendered employment policy”, a need ignored by both the Palestinian National Authority and the major aid donors, fundamentally reflects the limited participation by women in the institutions that set the policy agenda, and constrains ‘...women’s employment and income ... in all sectors.’ (WSC 1999:6).

And poverty feeds back on the status of women:

‘Gender inequalities contribute to poverty and poverty contributes to gender inequalities.’

(WSC 1999:7)

This feed-back (a mutual dependence rather than a dialectical relation – on *dialectics* see below) is a reflection of the lack of such institutional safe-guards as a “gender-aware” health and rights perspective to health entitlements, for example. Of course, such entitlements are precisely the sort of institutional, “localized” responses to the uncertainties of market exchange which the MAS/WB and NIE theorists believe negate the progressive impact of international, globalized market processes: such “localized” responses generate and perpetuate disadvantage. But then the MAS/WB definition of “progress” is distinct.

Education is another sphere in which, for structuralist theorists, inadequate institutional reforms are deemed to have constrained women’s participation in the development process and progress: ‘...[although education] ... shows a smaller gender gap than other sectors (labor, health, governance, etc..) ... the improvement in the educational level of females and the narrowing gender gap are not reflected in a greater share of women in the labor force or in public life as a whole.’ (WSC 1999:7/8)

‘Opportunities for the Palestinian women’s movement today stem from *specific local* conditions of political transition – where fundamental citizen’s rights are being determined and a development and political agenda being set – which offer opportunities for participation in shaping the emerging state and society.’

(WSC 1999:50, emphasis added)

Local conditions demand a “localized”, institutional response.

The structuralist emphasis throughout is upon the inadequacy of local, (potentially) pluralist institutions, to address the distributional disadvantage (Amartya Sen's "entitlements", see Sen 1999), of particular interest groups: in this case the rights of women in Palestine. In this regard, generally, in the structuralist vision of development, there is an emphasis on "decentralization"...

'...the construction of a world which is of a scale that can be grasped by the majority of people and is controlled by them within manageable *organizational systems*...'

(Atkinson 1991:124, emphasis added)

...a trend, which as we have seen, the World Bank characterizes as "localization":

'National governments are increasingly sharing responsibilities and revenues with subnational levels of government that are closer to the people affected by policy decisions. People are also forming NGOs [non-governmental organizations like the women's movement in Palestine] to pursue objectives such as political reform, environmental protection, gender equality, and better education.' (World Bank 2000:4).

For the World Bank such a sharing of responsibility with "sub-national levels of government" is antithetical to progress. While within a *structuralist* development strategy "localization" is progressive, within the intellectual parameters of the *modernization* strategy, sharing out social resources in the general interest according to local conditions, frustrate the potentials of enterprising individuals, undermining the benefits of liberalized world markets: "globalization". For modernization theorists the structuralist development vision is a recipe for impoverishment.

Conversely, for structuralist theorists, in as far as economic growth is a solution to poverty: 'It must ... be a *new form* of growth, sustainable, environmentally aware, egalitarian, integrating economic and social



development.’ (Brundtland 1987:59, emphasis added). Again the approach is holistic and multi-disciplinary; and social change, to be progressive, has to be under *local* control.

In a neo-liberal (MAS/WB) modernization strategy for Palestine, development will be advanced by the competitive power of trans-national corporations, *reinforced by* strategic decisions by powerful international institutions, especially the International Monetary Fund, the World Bank, and the World Trade Organization. Progress will be a consequence of incorporating Palestine into an increasingly liberalized world market. But for structuralist theorists, such a strategy can *only* lead to the *recolonization* of developing countries in general, and Palestine in particular.

With liberalized international markets, governments in general (and the Palestinian National Authority in particular) have even less sovereignty over development policy: there can be no effective local institutional management of progress. Competitive free market strategies for development, inevitably boost corporate profits and the incomes of shareholders, benefits which do not “trickle down” to the disadvantaged though market exchange, because independent utility maximizing individuals *are not conceived as being* the development dynamic. In a liberalized world market, governments, politically committed to a market based society and development strategy have to compete with each other - offering grants, tax holidays, or guaranteeing a compliant work-force in export processing zones, etc.. - to attract foreign investment, in the expectation of stimulating employment, rather than directly addressing the local needs of the disadvantaged and impoverished.

For structuralist theorists, such economic “rape” within free markets, in exchange for compensation willingly accepted (supposed employment benefits), is indistinguishable from the prostitution of the poor.

The disadvantage of the poor leads to the advantage of the rich: “economic recolonization”.

'The average per capita income of the poorest and middle thirds of all countries has lost ground steadily over the last several decades compared with the average income of the richest third.' (World Bank 2000:14). And the number of people living on less than \$1 a day '...rose from 1.2 billion in 1987 to 1.5 billion today and, if recent trends persist, will reach 1.9 billion by 2015.' (World Bank 2000:25).

There is no dispute between structuralists and modernizers about the "facts". The same impoverishing experience of social change is theoretically interpreted within the intellectual parameters of distinct conceptions of progress and *strategies* of development.

As noted earlier, for the past 20 years or so, a development strategy based on modernization theory, has dominated development studies, but such theories predict that with liberalized markets and free choice, poor countries will grow faster than rich ones: there will be a trend towards (world) economic "equilibrium". Developing countries should be able to copy technologies and production processes from developed countries, and according to orthodox subjective preference economic theory, the theoretical approach which underlies modernization development strategies, capital, expertise and knowledge should flow from richer, high wage economies, to economies where these resources are scarce, implying higher economic returns to investments.

But, as we have seen, there is no apparent trend towards "economic equilibrium" in the world economy, the poor are getting poorer. Is the problem "social" or "individual"; is the appropriate policy response reforming the institutional management of social existence, or reforming the mechanisms for controlling individuals' choices?

Is the problem "localization", or "globalization"?

Structuralists prioritize institutional decentralization; modernizers the deinstitutionalization of individuals' behaviour – “good governance”.

Within structuralist strategies, emphasising social co-operation within the parameters of a technical division of labour, there is a commitment to a degree of equality: institutionally managed distribution is a central concern for policy makers.

Without an ethic of *fairness*, without a wide-ranging commitment to equality, there will not be the social environment which will induce people to co-operate in the general interest. The inevitable distributional conflicts between competing interest groups (not merely individuals) are to be resolved through pluralist political institutions.

The development vision is not now of a perfectly competitive utopia, but of a managed social evolution, the dynamic of which is technical change (not individuals' preferences).

We are not now concerned with independent individuals competing to maximise personal advantage: rather people co-operate within the bounds of extant and emerging technologies, and an evolving institutional structure of society through which distributional struggles between distinct interest groups are resolved, is emergent.

#### Power and democracy and Palestinian development

‘Washing one’s hands of the conflict between the powerful and the powerless means to side with the powerful, not to be neutral.’

(Paulo Freire, see Freire 1972, and Mayo 1999)

Individuals are not believed to be selfishly concerned with their own interests and personal utility, and development is not effected by market exchange: neither are people understood to depend on society or development to be merely a result of the institutional management of technical change. Rather,

individuals are fundamentally *interdependent within* society: people are essentially “social individuals”. Human motivation and nature is not simply a reflection of people’s innate, genetic endowment of tastes and talents, nor simply individuals adapting to a social environment: social behaviour reflects a *dialectical relation* between individuals’ potentials and social existence – human nature is *emergent*.

‘The properties of individual human beings do not exist in isolation but arise as a consequence of social life, yet the nature of that social life is a consequence of our being human.’

(Rose, Kamin & Lewontin 1984:11)

People *themselves* change in the process of progress. Development is more than a question of individuals’ innate, competitive motivation to exchange (and maximise utility), and more than people’s natural co-operative intuitions being managed to adapt to the technical needs of society. There is a *dialectic* between the “individual” and “society”: each is the condition and effect of the other. As self-conscious beings, people learn from their social experience: *praxis* (see Cole 1999:Chapters 13, 14 and 17).

Progress reflects the individual/social “dialectic of human existence”: an evolving freedom *through* institutional change, which evolves with pressure for change *from below*. People empower themselves and establish the right to fulfil their potentials: *the right to develop*. Intellectuals are “facilitators” in raising people’s consciousness of their latent potentials, people becoming aware of the social context of their activity.

People *qualitatively* change with social experience. Individuals’ social potentials develop as people participate more effectively and combine and co-operate with each other in the social construction of progress. Development is an unpredictable process which evolves *through* people’s social activity; a process consequent on the *process of democracy*, as people learn how to participate more effectively in their social existence to progress.

There are complex social interrelationships *between* people, as individuals' choose how to best fulfil their unique, changing social potentials. In the process of progress, as people learn from their experience their choices and activity evolves, and change is *always* uncertain. History becomes of "paramount importance", '...the past imposes contingencies on the present and the future.' (Rose, Kamin & Lewontin 1984:11).

Human beings' defining characteristic, their "species being", is their *self-consciousness*. People are aware of *themselves*; they are able to reflect on their experience and consider how they might better realize their potentials. People can (socially) *choose*: but choice is contingent on their participation in the organization of society (see, Cole 1999:Chapter 17).

Within the extant social status quo, as their potentials evolve, individuals' achievements, are more or less frustrated by social obstacles to their participation in the process of social life. People might be unemployed, or suffer racial/religious discrimination, etc.: frustrations which limit people's opportunity to choose how to lead their lives to fulfil their social potentials. And a dialectical analysis highlights the "potential" courses of action which people "might" choose to expand and realize these potentials, depending on such ponderables as people's "awareness", their "social consciousness", their "self-confidence" to socially mobilize and organize, and the forces and obstacles that might be ranged against them in defence of the status quo, etc... Development is uncertain.

In the case of rights of the Palestinian people to choose how to order their affairs the most obvious constraint is Israeli occupation. The Zionist ambition to control Palestine, colonialism through implanting a Jewish settler community on Arab land, had its origins in the crisis of 19<sup>th</sup> century European capitalism. The rise of Jewish nationalism was a reaction to anti-semitism, itself a consequence of economic change and the consequent instability and insecurity.

'As capitalism advanced into Eastern Europe Jewish communities which had depended on their role in the feudal economy came under threat.'

(Marshall 1989:30)

In 1896, Theodore Herzl rationalized Jewish fears in the pamphlet *The State of the Jews*, calling for a Jewish state in an undeveloped, non-European territory.

With the fall of the Ottoman Empire at the end of the First World War, Palestine came under British control. Already in 1914, Chaim Weismann, a Zionist leader working as a scientist for the British government, had speculated that '...Palestine will fall within the influence of England ... we could easily move a million Jews into Palestine within the next 50-60 years...' (Weismann, quoted Marshall 1989:33). And on the 2<sup>nd</sup> November 1917 British foreign minister Lord Balfour declared that the government "...views with favour the establishment in Palestine of a national home for the Jewish people..." – and yet Palestine was the most densely populated area in the Eastern Mediterranean.

There were about 50,000 Jews already living in Palestine, and with immigration sponsored by European charities, by 1927 this had grown to over 150,000, 16% of a population of around a million (see, Marshall 1989:35). In the 1930s, with the rise of fascism in Europe there was a sharp increase in migrants (although most fled to Russia). Palestine was still under a British "mandate" and colonial policy was intended to facilitate Zionist land purchases and the establishment of Jewish militia. The subsequent Palestinian landlessness and unemployment led to unrest.

'By 1935 Palestine was in turmoil. Arab anger expressed years of frustration at the hands of a cynical British administration and the mineffectiveness of Arab leadership ... In April 1936, under enormous pressure from below, the Palestinian leadership reluctantly called a general strike. It demanded an end

to Jewish immigration, a ban on the sale of land to Jews, and the replacement of the British mandate regime by a government drawn from the majority of the population.'

(Marshall 1989:40)

In the face of martial law, collective punishment including demolition of homes and villages and internment, the Palestinian leadership capitulated, but resistance did not cease .

The Zionist crusade to establish a Jewish state continued, with support most notably from the United States where there was a strong US/Jewish political lobby. British and Zionist forces destroyed the anti-colonial movement, and in April 1948 Zionist militias began to drive the Arab population from large areas of Palestine. From a population of 1.3 million almost 1 million fled their homes, seeking refuge in the West Bank, Gaza, Lebanon, Syria and Jordan. Around 100,000 Arabs remained as Palestine became Israel.

Palestinian Arabs were denied their human rights.

'No one shall be subjected to arbitrary interference with his privacy, family, home or correspondence, not to attacks upon his honour and reputation. Everyone has the right to the protection of the law against such interference or attacks.'

(Article 12 of the *Universal Declaration of Human Rights*, adopted by the United Nations General Assembly on December 10<sup>th</sup> 1948)

And the first of many UN resolutions, affirming the right of Palestinian to their homes and property was passed the next day, December 11<sup>th</sup> 1948.

But Palestinian frustration is not only a nationalist question vis-à-vis colonialism and the establishment of a Zionist state. The maintenance of inequality within Arab society is a fundamental constraint, and '...mere

nationalism is not and never can be the answer.’ (Said 1994:xliv). It is not only a question of Palestinian “self-determination” – a Palestinian state – but *what kind of state, what form of self-determination.*

In the political culture of Arab states executive authority dominates constitutional and legal rights. Democracy is manifestly absent with autocratic rulers in control of finance, defence, foreign policy, etc... Typically there is no freedom of expression, and censorship of news papers, books, radio and T.V. is the norm. Summary arrest by secret police, torture, deplorable prison conditions are the backdrop to maintaining people’s compliance with their oppression and the yawning inequalities between the mass of disadvantaged citizens and a small privileged elite.

In 1964 the regimes of the Arab League , led by Gamel Abdel Nasser, President of Egypt founded the Palestinian Liberation Organization (PLO). In January 1965, al-Fatah, launched the first guerrilla raid against Israel which immediately galvanised the Palestinian diaspora in refugee camps; after 20 years of inactivity there was resistance. And when after the 6-day war in June 1967, in which Egyptian, Syrian and Jordanian forces had been defeated and Israel occupied the West Bank and Gaza (about 20% of the pre-1947 Palestine), 300 al-Fatah fighters fought off 15.000 Israeli troops near Karamah in Jordan, al-Fatah emerged as the dominant force in the PLO. The PLO was perceived as a popular organization.

‘We were the first Arabs at a grass roots level – and not because a colonel or a king commanded us – to start a movement to repossess a land and a history that had been rested from us. Our leaders were popular and accountable to us not hereditary or imposed on us from above.’

(Said 1994:xv)

A new self-critical style of politics evolved. Past and present leaders were criticized; people did not acquiesce to the suppression of their rights to freedom of thought and expression.



But there has always been a contradiction in the strategy of al-Fatah and chairman Arafat in particular, and the PLO in general: attempting to restore people's rights through *national* self-determination. 'Confrontation between the Palestinian masses and the Arab rulers was at the heart of the struggle for Palestinian self-determination.' (Marshall 1989:126, emphasis added).

After the victory at Karameh arms and finance from Arab regimes flowed to the PLO but...

'...the Palestinians could expect nothing from Arab regimes, for the most part corrupt and tied to imperialism, and that they [the PLO] were wrong to bank on any of the political parties in the region ... the Palestinians could rely only on themselves.'

(Iyad 1981:20, quoted Marshall 1989:116)

The first confrontation came in Jordan in 1970. The majority of people in the Jordanian capital Amman and in the north of Jordan, where the PLO had its bases, were of Palestinian origin. The PLO had its own fighters, civilian administration, welfare and educational organizations, etc.. – a state within a state – and when the ongoing struggle for political rights and a “people's assembly” (including Palestinian representation) within Jordan was backed by a general strike endorsed by al-Fatah, King Hussein loosed his troops on the PLO.

The PLO had since its inception by the Arab League abided by the principle of “non-interference” within the domestic politics of Arab nations and Egypt, Syria and Iraq stood by in the face of the onslaught as the PLO was expelled from Jordan and base camps were established in Lebanon.

The organization was rebuilt quite quickly, and included press agencies, research institutes and radio stations, as Palestinian businessmen gave large sums of money in the hope of establishing a state and a government which

would protect and enhance their economic influence, and King Faisal of Saudi Arabia, being assured that El Fatah was not a communist organization, supplied finance and weapons.

'Oil states, in particular Saudi Arabia, saw in aid to al-Fatah a means of preserving social peace at home. Palestinians made up much of the Saudi workforce and had been largely responsible for the great strikes that paralysed Aramco's operations in 1953 and 1954. A by-product of al-Fatah's organisation of Palestinians in the Gulf could be a "well-behaved" labour force'

(Kerr 1971:139, quoted Marshall 1989:131)

Over time principles and commitment have been sacrificed to political expediency and personal ambition. The Palestinian Authority, through which Yasir Arafat administers Palestinian life within parameters defined by Israel, is '...corrupt ... police and prisons are cruel ... torture is rife ... due process is suspended most of the time, and if you need to get anything done you have to have a connection with someone in the Authority.' (Said 2000:65).

Following the 1973 war between Arab states and Israel, American allies in the Arab world supported the American initiative of a Palestinian state in the West Bank and Gaza, under US and Arab supervision, in exchange for Palestinian recognition of Israel. Chairman Arafat and the PLO renounced "terrorism" and recognized Israel, and the future Palestinian state were discussed by Egypt's President Sadat, Israel's Menachem Begin, and President Jimmy Carter, *without Palestinian representation*, at Camp David, with an agreement signed March 26<sup>th</sup> 1979, at which....

'A fraction of the Palestinian people (under one-third of the whole) is promised a fraction of its rights (not including the national right of self-determination and statehood) in a fraction of its homeland (less than one-fifth of the area of the whole); and this promise is to be fulfilled several years from now through a step-by-step process in which Israel is to exercise a decisive veto power

over any agreement. Beyond that, the vast majority of Palestinians is condemned to permanent loss of its Palestinian national identity, to permanent exile and statelessness, to permanent separation from one another and from Palestine – to a life without hope or meaning.’

(Sayegh F 1979:40)

A life without hope or meaning breeds resistance.

Oppression, dehumanization and exploitation – the frustration of being denied their potentials and the suppression of people’s right to choose - has led to an ongoing process of Palestinian resistance. People ‘...still continued to fight for their inalienable rights to end exile and occupation...’ (Said 1980:194). Even when dispersed, driven out and defeated, to change society people have to believe in themselves, a belief that cannot be extinguished by military repression.

Demonstrations in Gaza led to 4 Gazan workers being killed 8<sup>th</sup> December 1987, the spark which lit a three year “Intifada”; the “uprising”. Demonstrators burnt tyres, threw stones and Molotov cocktails, brandished sticks and Palestinian flags, and were met with tear gas, night sticks, water cannon and bullets. In the absence of institutions of local government a new generation of young, militant leaders challenged the status quo: both Israeli and Arab.

The protests spread to the West Bank, and Palestinians within Israel participated in a strike in support of the occupied territories. Implementing a policy of “force, might and beatings” the deployment of Israeli troops was doubled in the West Bank and tripled in the Gaza Strip, and by the end of the month over 1200 Palestinians has been detained and at least 22 killed and over 200 wounded. But the curfews, detentions, tear gas, live ammunition and rubber bullets did not quell the daily demonstrations, strikes and unrest.

'By the end of February, with 80 Palestinians dead and 650 wounded in 4,800 violent incidents, it was clear ... that the "riots" represented more than a mere skirmish ... but a full scale rebellion...'

(Aronson 1987:328)

Within the Palestinian community, while formally acknowledging allegiance to the PLO, the creation of organizational and political structures to sustain the rebellion was unprecedented. Women's organizations shifted their focus from charity work to social issues; trades union membership increased; voluntary self-help work committees provided services; medical relief committees dispensed health care in camps and villages; and a nucleus of "popular committees" came into force by March which offered a framework for mass mobilization. By the summer of 1988 such bodies were widely established throughout neighbourhoods and camps and across particular sectors such as agriculture, education and security. A "Unified National Command of the Uprising" came into being, comprising al-Fatah, the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP), the Democratic Front for the Liberation of Palestine (DFLP) [both the PFLP and the DFLP had previously split off from al-Fatah in 1967/8 because of the emphasis on "national" rather than "political" liberation] , local communists, and the Islamic Jihad, and a clandestine network developed for the organization of the evolving strategy of civil disobedience and demonstrations to sustain the confrontation with the institutions of occupation.

While the Intifada was marked by severe repression from Israeli security forces, it nevertheless spawned a great many popular initiatives. People creatively responded to the denial of their human rights.

In the institutional vacuum self-reliance became a constant theme. Teachers and students developed alternative forms of education when the schools were closed; people planted gardens and raised chickens and animals; and the popular committees in towns and villages were active in promoting self-help in education, health, defence, agriculture and information.

'The basic intention ... was to establish an alternative system to the existing authority ... unconnected to the [PNA] regime.'

(Shumel Goren, co-ordinator of activities, quoted Aronson 1987:336)

In August the popular committees were outlawed; even membership was punishable with 10 years imprisonment.

In different contexts it has been in the interests of both Yasir Arafat and the Israeli state to re-establish control over Palestinian "self-determination". And the "peace process", which began secretly in 1993 in Oslo, was an expedient gamble by Arafat to regain the initiative within the Palestinian liberation movement.

Chairman Arafat's autocratic ambitions had to built ion the power of patronage, and Yitzhak Rabin's Zionist covenant of a Jewish state presupposed the pre-eminence of Jewish interests within an apartheid which controlled the exploitation of the Palestinian population.

The Israeli delegation pursued the negotiations according to a carefully prepared plan to consolidate their control over territory and not concede Palestinian sovereignty; and Yasir Arafat wanted the trappings of authority to assert his right to rule – an Authority with Ministries, a security force and a budget. Subsequently in the West Bank the Palestinian authority was only granted limited autonomy (not sovereignty) over about 3% of the land, and about 60% of the Gaza Strip - so-called Area A territory: Area B territory (rural areas and Palestinian villages) is jointly patrolled by Israeli and Palestinian security forces although Israel controls security; and area C territory containing all the Israeli settlements, roads and military bases, is totally controlled by Israel.

'By a stroke of the pen Arafat agreed to the cantonization of his people under his jurisdiction, while Israel retained control of who could go where.' (Said

2000:82). Israel retained the Jewish settlements on Arab land; control of security; exists and entrances to Palestinian areas, the economy and water resources. In the aftermath of the agreement Palestinian poverty and unemployment have become much worse, and land expropriation and the expansion of settlements has continued unabated. And Palestinians have '...extremely limited rights, no sovereignty and little self-determination.' (Said 2000:67). But within these limits Arafat has absolute power, his '...word ... is law, *he* is the Authority and very little can get done without him; he is the sole source of patronage and only he knows the full size of the budget.' (Said 2000:179, emphasis added).

The realities of Palestinian life are a double occupation of the Israelis and the Palestinian Authority: '...it is difficult to say that Arafat and what he represents constitute a genuine alternative to the unacceptable vision of things offered [by Israel]. Is Arafat's vision really any better?' (Said 2000:66).

*Everything* has to be approved by him, even requests for a vacation by an Ministry employee, and he occupies no fewer than 30 official posts. By far his greatest concern is with his security. There are estimated to be 20 (nobody really knows how many) security organizations under his control. Beyond this '...the man has no vision, no idea of where we are going, no plans, no sense of direction. All he deals with are the details, and he loves those because he can be in complete control. And they take up all of his time. That's the way he stays on top: everything has to pass through him.' (Yasir Abd Rabbo, Minister of Information and Minister of Culture, quoted Said 2000:98/9).

The lack of a development vision means no moral purpose generating social change, no conception of what constitutes "progress"; development is serendipity. The absence of vision explains the attraction of the dogmatic certainties of religion, and the appeal of Hamas, Islamic Jihad and Hizbollar. Terrorism, the embodiment of hopelessness, becomes a rational option.

What is to be done in the face of...

'...widespread poverty and frustration, food shortages, and continued incursions by Israeli military forces against civilians ... four hundred fifty thousand refugees in Lebanon remain stateless, given no permission to work or move, and face mass deportations; almost the same number or more refugees in Syria are quarantined in camps without adequate attention to their needs, and over a million in Jordan, and several thousand more in various other Arab countries linger in a limbo without respite ... a corrupt, cruel, and incompetent regime of autocracy under Arafat rules Palestine for the benefit of a small handful of cronies. There are monopolies ... on nearly every commodity ... all of them shamelessly enriching Arafat, his lieutenants, and their children. A popularly elected Legislative Council has been unable for three years to pass any laws or make any constitutional inroads on a despot who controls the budget, in addition to his twenty security forces who torture, kill, imprison critics and ban their books ... The Palestinian population ... is at the mercy of an incompetent man who serves as the implementer of Israel occupation and dispossession, and who can do nothing more for his people except oppress and deceive them.'

(Said 2000:163/4)

'Corruption? Venality? Incompetence? Or is it moral idiocy... ?' (Said 2000:7)  
Most Palestinians are forced to live outside Palestine, and the Palestinian people must seek progress with new leaders, leaders who have a vision of development and a purpose to social change.

The underlying anger, the feeling of impotence and exasperation, the emotion of self-disgust, the frustrations that became the Intifada, erupted again after Ariel Sharron, a right-wing politician opposed to the "concessions" of the "peace process", deliberately visited the al-Aqsa hilltop compound within the walled city of Jerusalem, with 1000 police for protection, to publicly demonstrate Israeli sovereignty over Islam's holy sites. The next day, 29<sup>th</sup> September 2000, after Friday prayers at the Aqsa mosque, Muslim protestors

stoned Jewish targets. In the melé 5 protestors were shot and killed, and 200 injured. And so began the “Aqsa Intifada”.

In the next 10 days more than 80 people died and 2000 were injured, including 12 year old Mohammed al-Durrah and his father Jamal, cowering beneath a wall and who died after 45 minutes of constant gunfire from Israeli troops. The TV pictures of this execution galvanized Palestinian resolve, and persistent and widespread anti-US/Israel protests in the Arab world, including: Egypt, Iraq, Syria, Tunisia, Sudan, Libya, Yemen, Morocco, United Arab Emirates, Saudi Arabia and Jordan. In Jordan alone, in the first week of October, there were more than 3000 protest meetings and marches. And in the wider world, thousands of Muslims marched in Jakarta, the Taliban in Afghanistan called for a Holy War against Israel, 5 synagogues were torched in France, in Chicago a rabbi was sprayed with bullets, in South Africa 2 policemen were stabbed outside the Israeli embassy, etc...

The Aqsa Intifada has been distinct from the Intifada of the 1989-91 in that , the Arab citizens of Israel (about 20% of the population) have shown solidarity with their West Bank/Gaza cousins by demonstrating for equal rights within Israel, over, jobs, schools, housing, social services, and health care.

‘What is taking place in the streets of Arab towns and neighbourhoods is... a revolt. A revolt against the Jewish majority in whose midst they live...’  
(*Ha’aretz* newspaper 5/10/00)

‘People were thunderstruck by the intensity and pervasiveness of the rioting unprecedented in Israel’s 52 year history.’ (*Economist* 7/10/00). An intensity and pervasiveness which four days later led to mosques and Arab businesses in Tel Aviv being wrecked by Jewish mobs, in ‘...the worst explosion of sectarian hatred since the Jewish state was created 52 years ago.’ (*Guardian* newspaper 11/10/00).



And two days later, 3 Israeli soldiers were seen acting suspiciously in Ramallah and ran into the police station for protection (personnel who the Israeli army insist were administrators on their way to a local army base and got lost, but who Palestinians identified as members of an elite undercover army unit, who were spotted outside a school with electronic equipment). The police station was quickly besieged by angry Palestinians who beat and stabbed to death two of the fugitives.

After what the Israeli prime minister described as “a cold blooded lynching”, which the foreign minister Shlomo Ben Ami said showed “total contempt for the sanctity of human life” (and this said without a trace of irony), the Israeli army showed respect for human life and hit back with advanced Apache helicopter gunships in Ramallah, Gaza City and Jericho. Even though the Apache helicopter “can move low over targets and distinguish between civilians and combatants” civilians were surprisingly casualties. And tanks rolled into position across the West Bank.

In a flurry of diplomatic activity, UN secretary general Kofi Annan, Javier Solana the European Union chief foreign policy representative, Russian foreign minister Igor Ivanov, Hosni Mubarak the Egyptian president, and Robin Cook the British foreign secretary, were all, to quote Kofi Annan, appealing “to leaders and citizens alike to stop and think about what they are doing”, and the call was for a high level summit meeting, to call a cease fire, inquire into the causes of the violence, and reactivate the “peace process”.

As if a ceasefire could reverse the 52 years of Palestinian dispossession and the 33 years of military occupation, and the four years of the “peace process” during which Israel’s illegal settler population on Palestinian land has almost doubled, expanding by 90,000, and unemployment within the Palestinian population has risen dramatically, living standards have halved, and the daily indignities, which in the South African context were called apartheid, continue to intensify Palestinian frustrations, anger and despair.

There is no “peace process” to believe in.

As I write this (mid-October 2000), both sides are organizing themselves into their own militias. Society is being fractured under the pressure of sectarian violence: on the Israeli side prime minister Ehud Barak is accommodating the right-wing opponent of “concessions” to the Palestinians, Ariel Sharron, into his government; and on the Palestinian side Yasir Arafat has freed 350 fundamentalist Hamas militants from detention.

The calling of a summit of heads of state is an act of desperation rather than a meaningful attempt to resolve the contradictions of Zionism and Palestinian self-determination. Until the systematic denial of people’s dignity is acknowledged, and people have the right to participate in the political organization of their lives, the right to choose, there can be no lasting peace in Palestine or in Israel.

The end of an unjust “peace process” can be the beginning of progress, democracy and development in Palestine. “One day nemesis will come” (Tim Llewellyn, *Observer* newspaper, 15/10/00)

In Palestine there is a leadership vacuum. On the 9<sup>th</sup> October more than 1000 Palestinian officials and intellectuals signed a petition calling on Arafat to suspend peace talks, and some activists called for all-out war, including attacking the 200,000 Jewish settlers on the West Bank. But neither Jews nor Palestinians have a viable military option. The only future is co-existence. And herein lies a role for intellectuals (in both Israel and) in Palestine, and in particular, in the context of this book, Palestinian academics.

Democracy in Palestine, in its widest sense, is a political and a moral struggle. And Palestinian intellectuals can reactivate the political will, and encourage moral sensibilities, and the belief that progressive change is possible, by showing that people *can* make a difference if their activity is organized to progressively fulfil individuals’ changing potentials. To assert people’s right to

develop. People will begin to believe they can make a difference when they believe in themselves. And people will begin to believe in themselves as they understand the social context of their individual activity and can identify purposeful strategies for self-fulfilment. People have to be able to use their initiative and socially *choose* how to organize their lives – a process of participation and democracy. It is a process of people becoming conscious of their *social* potentials.

Power is a relationship that is exercised through a cultural order, and the role of intellectuals, self-consciously and morally acting in the interests of the disadvantaged, is of decisive importance in facilitating a culture based on human dignity, through which people are aware of and have the opportunities to fulfil their evolving potentials.

Universities can train intellectuals to be facilitators in the process of progress. They would not be crass *empiricists* identifying mechanisms of social control, nor merely *pragmatic*, often a euphemism for “unprincipled”, but *idealists*. But not naïve idealists unaware of the struggles and traumas of social change, but people with a “vision”, who can nurture people’s intuitions as to what they might become.

Such an emphasis on education is a crucial aspect of the process of progress: the long-term strategy of realizing people’s humanity. Part and parcel of this strategy is the development of an international solidarity movement, similar to the anti-apartheid movement which up until 1994 worked for fundamental change in South Africa, or the Cuban Solidarity Campaign actively defending the gains of the Cuban Revolution against the U.S. attempts to destabilize Cuban socialist development. Such movements are *moral* campaigns bringing to the attention of the world fundamental injustices (see, Said 2000:Chapter 29).



## **An Educational Culture To Understand Palestinian Development**

'We need to free ourselves from the habit of seeing culture as encyclopaedic knowledge, and men as receptacles to be stuffed full of empirical data ... It serves only to create maladjusted people, people who believe they are superior to the rest of humanity because they have memorized more facts ... Culture is something quite different. It is organization, discipline of one's inner self, a coming to terms with one's own personality; it is attainment of higher awareness ... But none of this can come about through spontaneous evolution ... only by degrees, one stage at a time, has humanity acquired consciousness of its own value and won for itself the right to throw off the patterns of organization imposed on it by minorities ... this consciousness was formed ... as a result of intelligent reflection ... every revolution has been preceded by an intense labour of criticism, by the diffusion and spread of ideas amongst masses of men ... A critique implies ... self-consciousness ... to be master of oneself ... to exist as an element of order – but of one's own order and one's own discipline in striving for an ideal.'

(Gramsci, quoted Foracs 1988:57, 58, 59)

## Experience and reality

People make history.

“The first premise of all human history is, of course, the existence of living human individuals. Thus the first fact to be established is the physical organization of these individuals and their consequent relation to the rest of nature ... The writing of history must always set out from these natural bases and the modification in the course of history *through the action of men.*”  
(Marx and Engels 1970:42, emphasis added)

As we have seen, the experience of social change can be and is variously interpreted and understood according to what is believed to be the fundamental basis of human motivation: the dynamic of social change, why the “action of men”, the dynamic of development, changes.

Is it simply that people change their minds? Do people choose to behave differently? Are people sufficiently *independent* of society to be able to act in their individual interests?

Alternatively, does the environmental parameters to social life limit the options for choice? We *depend* upon each other within these parameters: we all share the same natural environment. Are there technological and natural resource constraints beyond our control and which limit what we can choose to do? Constraints which have to be managed.

Or, as creative, self-conscious beings, is it that humans construct the basis of social co-operation themselves, albeit, at least in the short term, within environmental limits? These environmental limits are essentially defined by known technologies and the organization of work; the social means of production. The mode of production evolves as social participation advances with people’s expanding social potentials. And in as far as particular individuals control the means of production, there will be inequality and these

people will be tend to be advantaged: they will have more choice over their standard of living. People's relationship to the control of the means of production defines their class position.

But these are *social* means of production: and individuals *never* have absolute control, *no-one* has absolute power. Power is a *relationship*. We are all, socially, *interdependent*. There are always ways in which the disadvantaged and powerless can challenge the powerful, if they are conscious of the potentials and their interests and understand their social predicament. People learn from their social experience, and change *themselves* through that experience. By understanding their past people can purposefully begin to change their future, by politically combining and organizing to act in their class interest.

Progress does not have to be serendipity: development does not have to be contingent on independent individuals making the "right" choices, or scientists discovering new technologies and a new technical division of labour which promises a bountiful future. Social life is not fatefully determined by forces beyond our control: we hold the parameters of reality and progress *in our hands*.

In the analyses of Palestinian development above, we have seen that visions on human nature define development perspectives: and development perspectives set the parameters of development strategies; and the strategy specifies the problems to be addressed by development theorists.

And visions on development are intellectually biased – highlighting the importance of talented individuals, expert managers, or democratic empowerment – biases with political implications for the implementation of development policy – representative free market conservatism, pluralist social democracy, or participative socialism.

## An Educational Culture For Development Studies

How are these insights to be incorporated into a coherent teaching programme, for Development Studies. Given that institutionalized knowledge is organized into academic disciplines and typically students are conceived of a “receptacles to be stuffed with empirical data” (Paulo Freire’s “banking” concept of education, see Freire 1972), what might be the structure of a programme intended to facilitate people acquiring “a consciousness of their own value”? A consciousness through which people might empower themselves to “throw off the patterns of organization imposed on them by minorities”? A “consciousness formed as a result of intelligent reflection”?

Such an awareness is built upon a theoretical understanding of people’s intuitions; people self-consciously constructing conceptions of social reality beyond their experience, and explaining and accounting for that experience; making explicit the potentials that might purposefully be achieved with class conscious political activity.

Fundamentally the ideological context of theoretical analysis has to be explicit.

The reality of social change, progress and development is a “theoretical reality”. To be able to understand this social reality, particular experiences have to be abstracted from the wider social context, not least because we cannot know the extent of that context. We can conceptualize different levels of reality: the reality of personal life, *what* people experience; the reality of *how* social life is organized; and the reality of social relationships, which on the one hand set the parameters to our experience, and on the other suggest potentials for what we might become, defining *why* society evolves as it does.

The science of asking “What?” and describing the events of experience is Karl Popper’s positivism; the technique for asking “How?” society functions is Thomas Kuhn’s paradigms; and the analytical approach of praxis allows us to



ask qualitative questions of “Why?” and understand the process of social change (see Cole 1999:Part4).

Positivist, paradigmatic and praxis methodologies are each coherent within their respective intellectual parameters, and it is a dialectical relation between positivist (what) and paradigmatic (how) analytical techniques that allows us to understand the praxis of “why”, and be conscious of the potentials of development.

## **Vision, perspective, strategy, theory and policy**

To purposefully improve social life we have to understand existence: understandings which are theorizations of social reality within the parameters of a strategy, reflecting a vision of progress.

Hence development policies and theorizations of social experience have to be situated within a strategic context, reflecting visions of human nature. And just as positivist analyses can be reconciled to a paradigmatic approach through the dialectic of knowledge which is praxis, so analyses and policies rationalized within a modernization strategy can be reconciled to the priorities within structuralist parameters within the context of a “power and democracy” strategic approach to progress.

### **Intellectuals and development**

Ultimately the only reality is the reality of experience.

As creative beings we learn from our experience, and in the social construction of reality, also construct ourselves. We are *interdependent* within society; our potentials evolve as we learn from each other: and with development the parameters of participation in social existence become ever more extensive. Such parameters can *only* be identified *theoretically*.

The role of the intellectual.

Within a modernization strategy and reductionist vision of progress, policy is oriented to creating the utopia of “perfect competition”. Intellectuals are “empiricists”, attempting to realistically *describe* social experience, from which policy prescriptions, are derived, based on the assumption (belief) that individuals are independent, utility maximizers. Development policy is intended to control people’s “natural” competitive motivation to maintain an environment of individual liberty, so that the *actual* world, characterized by individuals trying to protect and preserve any competitive advantage they

might enjoy, can better approximate, to the *ideal* world of perfect individual freedom.

On the other hand, structuralist theorists are “pragmatic” problem solvers. Individuals’ natural instincts to co-operate have to be managed within the parameters of an expanding technical division of labour, and productive systems become ever more efficient and productive. Experts co-ordinate social activity in the general interest, an interest determined within a social democratic system of democracy. Problems of co-operation within emerging technologies are holistically reconciled within the priorities defined by pluralist democratic institutions.

Within the power and democracy strategy and participative vision, the ideal is communism: the individual situated within society. A dialectic between individuals’ freedom and rational management, within a society that is in a process of change as people’s potentials evolve.

The ideal is a communist society in which...

‘...each can become accomplished in *any branch he wishes* ... and thus makes it possible for me to one thing today and another tomorrow, to hunt in the morning, fish in the afternoon, rear cattle in the evening criticism after dinner ... *without ever becoming* hunter, fisherman, herdsman or critic.’

(Marx & Engels 1970:83, 54, emphasis added)

This is an image of the future as utopian as any modernizers’ fantasy about a “perfectly competitive” world. But it is not a naive “idealism”; it is a conception of human potentials reflecting the process by which people realize their creativity. As individuals change with social experience, at times the fulfilment of their potentials leads to conflict and people challenge the social status quo to better participate in the control of their lives. It is not a vision of utopia to be replicated in policy initiatives, but is an emergent process reflecting people’s changing potentials.

Within the power and democracy development strategy development policy is defined within a *socialist* strategy: the *process* of moving towards the communist ideal of realizing people's potentials as "hunter, fisherman, herdsman, critic", etc...

'Socialism is ... a process of successive upheavals not only in the economy, politics and ideology but in conscious and organized action. It is a process premised on unleashing the *power of the people*, who learn how to change themselves along with their circumstances. Revolutions within the revolution demand creativity and unity with respect to principles and organization and broad and *growing* participation. In other words, they must become a gigantic school through which people learn to direct social processes. *Socialism is not constructed spontaneously, not is it something that can be bestowed.*'

(Heredia 1993:64, emphasis added)

Development *is* the "process" of democracy; people learn to participate in society as their social potentials evolve.

As societies change, styles of life, habits and social mores adjust to the evolving social relationships which reflect emerging patterns of participation. Inevitably people who have been relatively privileged will be reluctant to embrace change; individuals naturally rationalize the parameters of social life to understand their experience. And it is the role of the intellectual to facilitate people's understanding of the process of social change so as to situate their individual experience in the wider social context, so that activity and policy can be organized to advance progress.

'Development and education are first of all about liberating people from all that holds them back from a full human life. Ultimately development and education are about transforming society ... Development, liberation and transformation are all aspects of the same process. It is not a marginal activity. It is at the core of all *creative* human living ... Those with education

and skills have a role to play in enabling the poor to participate actively in identifying and analysing the causes of their problems, uniting them in finding solutions. The needs of the people must be strategically linked to public policy. Coalitions of organizations and community groups must be built to advocate these policies.'

(Hope & Trimmel 1995:9 and 12, emphasis added)

And where the extant social structure is organized according to contradictory class interests, then...

"...[a]t that point an era of social revolution begins. With the change in the economic foundation the whole immense [legal and political] super-structure is more slowly or more rapidly transformed. In considering such transformations it is always necessary to distinguish between the material transformation of the economic conditions ... and the legal, political, religious, artistic or philosophic ... forms in which men become conscious of this conflict and fight it out."

(Marx 1976:3-4)

No aspect of social existence is beyond social control. Progress, development and social change evolve with a growing awareness of the social constraints frustrating the realization of people's potentials.

It is a question of "class consciousness": not only an awareness that other disadvantaged people, with a more or less different experience of social life, face similar frustrations and share a similar interest; *but also* solidarity action to support particular experiences of disadvantage, whether it be a conflict over adequate health care, education, homelessness, human rights, etc...

"Men make their own history, but they do not do it as they please, they do not make it under circumstances chosen by themselves, but under circumstances directly encountered."

(Marx 1950:255)

People have to be conscious of the wider social context of their experience, and the development theorist becomes a facilitator of this growing awareness. Class consciousness is not only something that people *possess*, it is also something they *do*: the professional intellectual fosters such a consciousness: the intellectual as activist (see, Cole 1999:202-5, and Ollman 1993).

Such an awareness of the individual/social dialectic of existence cannot result from analyses which only address *individuals'* choices and experience (i.e. positivist, reductionist, disciplinary intellectual parameters to theoretical analysis); nor is an emphasis on the *social* structural context of individuals' choices adequate (i.e. paradigmatic, holistic, multi-disciplinary approach to knowledge). These are only partial visions of human nature and perspectives on human experience.

'...none of us can live fully ... as long as we are overwhelmed by a false view of the world and a false view of human nature to buttress it. Learning how a system can cause hunger then becomes, not a lesson in misery and deprivation, but a vehicle for a great awakening in our lives.'

(Lappé and Collins 1977:329)

"Progress" as an evolution of people's potentials demands that *individuals'* evolving experience within their *social* existence is addressed. The science of praxis is an inter-disciplinary analysis of human existence.

"...we humans have interacted with other members of our species and changed ourselves: our sense of identity has changed recursively as each interaction has built in the results of the previous ones."

(Stewart & Cohen 1997:222)

This is not the trivial positivist analysis of what people "choose" to do. Nor is it the multi-disciplinary paradigm "jigsaw" approach to knowledge; analytically piecing together various aspects of people's experience abstracted out of their

life process. For the science of praxis people have a creative consciousness which reflects *all* of their experience. How we exchange in the economy might reflect our intuitions and values which have evolved in our family life, which will in part reflect our education, leisure activity, religion, involvement in formal politics, etc... No one aspect of experience is fully understandable without an understanding of *all* of our experience, and each person in some small way affects and is affected by everyone else. The role of the “organic intellectual”. ‘There is no organization without intellectuals ... without the theoretical aspect of the theory-practice nexus being distinguished concretely by the existence of a group of people “specialized” in conceptual and philosophical elaboration of ideas. But the process of creating intellectuals is long, full of contradiction ... in which the loyalty of the masses is sorely tried. ... The process of development is tied to a dialectic between the intellectuals and the masses.’ (Gramsci, quoted Foracs 1988:334).

‘The institutional intellectual writes for and works within the confines of other institutional intellectuals ... As political ideologues they establish the boundaries with the liberal political class. The organic intellectuals [intellectuals working towards cultural transformation] move in the world of the rank-and-file political activists and militants ... Their work links local struggles in the mines, banks, factories as concrete examples of global imperialist domination. They link social discontent to political struggles against a clearly determined class state.’ (Petras & Morley 1992:161)

All of our experience is relevant to the understanding of any part, but, of course it is impossible to know *everything*. Knowledge is a *process*, that continually evolves with our changing potentials. And the more complete our analysis of social experience, the better will be our understanding of people's potentials, and potentially the greater will be people's class consciousness; the more effective will be mobilization and organization of people to realize their potentials - *progress*.

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‘A development vision for Palestine will direct and unify efforts towards desired goals. Such a vision must be based on the right of the Palestinian people for political self-determination, must allow for the effective participation of individuals and groups in the development process, and must recognise the importance of.. equity, justice, and responsibility towards future generations. *It is a development vision that begins and ends with human beings.*’

(DSP 1999:6, emphasis added)



## APPENDIX

A draft course outline for

### UNDERSTANDING PALESTINIAN DEVELOPMENT

Intellectual parameters

- Students should be able to contrast and compare competing analyses of development issues, and be aware of the implications and significance of alternative policy prescriptions.
- A Development Studies programme must coherently present development analyses as reflections of distinct development *strategies*, the logic of which derives from perspectives on progress, implying particular analytical methodologies.
- These perspectives define the role of intellectuals in the development process: describing empirical reality (employing positivist analytic techniques); explaining empirical reality (working within a paradigm approach to knowledge); understanding competing explanations (employing praxis as a process of self-awareness). The intellectual as, empiricist, expert and activist.
- These different approaches to knowledge build on each other, and imply a progression from disciplinary analysis, to multi-disciplinarity, to inter-disciplinarity (positivism, paradigms and praxis). Hence there is an evolution through the programme in the style of teaching and learning.

Programme structure

- I am assuming for the purposes of this draft outline, a 1 year (2 semester) programme, with full-time university students. Clearly over different time-periods, and with different students (e.g. part-time, or pre-university, or training courses for officials, etc...), the programme would be adjusted, but within the overall structure set out below.
- There will be two compulsory courses which will run over both semesters: *Knowledge and Progress*, and *Development Analysis*.
- These courses will be “linked” by case-study workshops, illustrating that different perspectives on progress, working within different intellectual parameters, can coherently address different questions, asking “What?”,

“How?”, and “Why?”. And each of these approaches to knowledge is an essential component in the understanding of development.

- *Knowledge and Progress.*

Examining the intellectual parameters to analyses of development, there will be 3 (sequential) sections to the course: *Modernization Theory, Structuralism, Democracy & Power*. The ideological implications of (and political interests served by) each of these aspects of understanding development will be highlighted.

- *Development Analysis.*

This course will address the distinct analytical methodologies that underlie perspectives on progress. “What?” questions, deducing descriptions of social experience from quantitative data – positivism; “How?” questions, inducing explanations from these descriptions – paradigms; “Why?” questions, intuitively understanding competing explanations – praxis.

- *Case-Studies.*

*Knowledge & Progress* and *Development Analysis* will be linked by case study analyses. The *same* data will be used in different contexts, for instance data on education. Education needs and resources would be first of all be positively described; then alternative pragmatic policy alternatives would be designed; each of these alternatives will be considered with regard to realizing as yet unmet human potentials, potentials which evolve with people’s social experience.

- Apart from these compulsory courses there would be two optional themes on offer in each semester, and students would follow one. The number of courses within each theme will reflect resource availability, and faculties’ particular interests and experience. These themes are grouped around aspects of people’s evolving potentials with social experience: *Social Policy -education, Social policy - health, Participation – law, rights, democracy, Participation – production, consumption and exchange.*

- Within each of the optional themes, relevant development issues will be addressed such as: Non-Governmental Organizations, Civil Society, Inequality – class, ethnicity, gender, religion, occupation, etc..., Environmental Sustainability, Globalization, etc.... These optional courses

would therefore be taught on a “team basis”, with different specialists thematically combining the analysis of development issues in terms of realizing human potentials.

- Towards the end of the second semester students would work on a dissertation, on a theme combining the emphases of the compulsory courses, and the two options they have followed in the Social Policy and Participation streams.
- There should be links between participative institutions of civil society (NGOs, community organizations, etc...) which would define the issues and themes to be addressed by students in their dissertations. Intellectuals (students) would begin to adopt the role of facilitating people’s consciousness of the social context of their experience.



**SEMESTERS ONE & TWO**

Knowledge & progress	Modernization theory	Structuralism	Power & democracy	<b>D I S S E R T A T I O N</b>
Case study (education)	Describe needs/ resources	Define policy alternatives	Evaluate policies with regard to realizing potentials	
Development analysis	What? Positivism, deductive, description, from quantitative data	How? Paradigms, inductive, explanation from description explanations	Why? ----- praxis, intuitive, understanding from competing	
Options				
Social policy	Education	Health		
Participation	Law, rights, democracy	Production, consumption and exchange		

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